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Prospects for Strong Emergence in Chemistry 
Robin F. Hendry (University of Durham) – r.f.hendry@dur.ac.uk  
 
ABSTRACT – Chemistry and physics are so closely intertwined that for many philosophers it hardly seems possible 
that chemistry should be autonomous in any ontologically serious way. Firstly, chemistry itself individuates 
substances by their microstructural properties. Secondly, during the twentieth century chemistry and physics worked 
closely together to provide physical explanations of the structure, bonding and behaviour of molecules. I argue that 
each of these facts is fully consistent with the existence of strongly emergent chemical properties, understood as 
involving downward causation. The prospects for strong emergence in chemistry are at least as good as those of 
reduction. 
 
1. Introduction. 
How is it possible that there could be downward causation in chemistry? Since the chemical 
revolution chemists have pursued a research programme which has successively identified the 
elemental constitution of compound substances, and explained their behaviour in terms of that 
constitution. In the nineteenth century they began to think of elemental composition in terms of 
atomic constitution, and devised structures at the atomic scale, diversity among which accounted 
for the existence of distinct substances (isomers) that have the same elemental composition. In 
the twentieth century the relationship was deepened further by discovering the structure of atoms 
themselves, and how their parts (electrons and nuclei), and the interactions between them, 
underpin the structures that individuate substances and explain their behaviour. At the same time 
the structures themselves were fleshed out using the joint resources of theory and experiment. 
Thus classical mechanics, the structural theories of the nineteenth century, the ‘old’ quantum 
theory, quantum mechanics, X-ray crystallography, spectroscopy, and dear old chemical 
inference all pulled together to provide, by the early twenty-first century, detailed theories of 
how nuclei and electrons are arranged within substances, how they move and interact, and how 
these structures and processes give rise to the phenomena that chemists and physicists study. 
Does this undoubted intellectual achievement not amount to a reduction? It does not, I argue. 
Chemistry supplied the atoms, and initially the physicists took some persuading of their 
existence: the physicists came late to chemical atomism.1 Furthermore, chemistry’s distinct 
perspective on structure at the molecular scale was an indispensible part of the development of 
structural explanation in both physics and chemistry. The whole enterprise was a collaboration, 
and it is perhaps surprising that it is not seen that way more widely in philosophy and physics, 
and indeed chemistry itself. We should regard the process as a synthesis of chemistry and 
physics, not a reduction of one to the other. But the reductionist will say, quite correctly, that 
these are merely historical points. We have a theory of everything (non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics), at least for chemistry, that can, in principle, explain everything about molecules. My 
question is: let’s examine the assumption that such a theory exists, and examine what the theories 
that we know to exist can, and cannot, do for us. 
 
2. Setting Up the Question. 
Many philosophers and scientists are convinced that there can be no strong emergence in 
chemistry, and that this view is supported by evidence from physics and chemistry. In this paper 
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 It is important to distinguish between the atoms of Boyle and of Dalton. For Boyle, atoms may play this or that 
explanatory role, but there is no assumed connection between the number and diversity of atoms and the identity of 
chemical substances known in the laboratory. For Dalton, there is one distinct kind of atom for each chemical 
element, and so a clear relevance to chemical explanation.  
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I will argue that they are mistaken in believing the second part of that sentence to be true. I am 
not going to argue against reductionism: my aim is the weaker epistemic one of convincing the 
reader that the scientific evidence for the existence of strong emergence in chemistry is at least as 
good as the evidence for reductionist positions that rule it out. I want the reductionists to stop 
thinking not only that their position is forced on us by the evidence, but also that it is in any way 
more plausible or better supported by the evidence than the strong emergentist’s. To do that I 
have to explain what I mean by strong emergence, and also set some terms for the debate: what 
should and should not count as an appropriate source of evidence. 
It is common to make a distinction between weak and strong emergence. For a property to be 
weakly emergent from physics requires that physics provides insufficient resources to make a 
practical basis for predicting or explaining a system’s possession of that property, and the causal 
powers it confers. Strong emergence requires that the failure to predict and explain is there in 
principle. In metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, it has been common recently to use causal 
efficacy as a mark of reality, following either Plato’s Eleatic stranger (Colyvan (2001: Chapter 
3)) or Samuel Alexander (Kim (1998: 119), (2005: 159)), according to preference. To exist 
requires the possession of causal powers. Applied to the case of reduction and emergence, one 
might use the conferment of additional causal powers as a mark of the distinct reality that is 
characteristic of something that is strongly emergent. Now the possession of novel causal powers 
does not require the violation of more fundamental laws. Strong emergence requires not that 
these laws be broken, but only that they fail to determine what happens. This will be the case 
where, for instance, fundamental laws fail to favour one of a number of different possibilities, 
with the missing determination provided by the strongly emergent property. 
In other papers (Hendry (2006a), (2010a), (2010b)) I have attributed to Broad (1925) the view 
that strong emergence involves downwards causation: that the subsystems of an emergent 
supersystem sometimes do something different to what they would do if the causal structure of 
the world were as imagined by the reductionist. In short, the strong emergentist makes a 
counternomic claim. Filling out this bare sketch of the emergentist position then requires one to 
identify just how, in particular scientific cases, the reductionist imagines the causal structure of 
the world to be. 
Evidence: I will assume in what follows that philosophical intuition is an unreliable guide to 
composition and reduction. Reasons to regard X as reducible to Y should come from science, not 
from a priori argument. 
 
3. Chemical Substances. 
One reason why many philosophers reject the idea that there can be any strong emergence in 
chemistry is that they think that the reducibility of chemical entities and properties to physical 
entities and properties, or their identity with physical entities and properties, has been established 
through such theoretical identities as “water is H2O”. The argument is supposed to be that “water 
is H2O” should be read as “water = H2O”. In short, to be H2O just is to be composed of H2O 
molecules. This settles the reduction issue as we have framed it for the purposes of this paper, 
because if the contents of a particular jug have any causal powers in virtue of being water (e.g. 
the power to quench thirst, or to dissolve salt), then those contents have those powers in virtue of 
their being composed of H2O molecules. I will not challenge the claim that “water is H2O”, so 
long as that claim is properly construed.2 I have argued elsewhere that chemical substances are 
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 For a range of different reasons, the identity is challenged by Barbara Malt (1994), Paul Needham (2000), (2002), 
(2011), Jaap van Brakel (2000) and Michael Weisberg (2006). 
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individuated by their microstructural properties and relations (see Hendry (2006b), (2008)), and 
have more recently come to the view that a substance’s structure at the molecular scale is what 
makes it the substance that it is, from a chemical point of view (Hendry (2016)). However, I will 
argue that the widespread idea that the identity “water is H2O” establishes reducibility, or some 
chemical analogue of the mind-brain identity theory, is the product of a straightforward 
misreading. 
What is the scientific basis of a theoretical identity such as “water is
 
H2O”? Historically, it was 
established via a number of distinct steps, the first being the compositional claim that water  is a 
compound of hydrogen and oxygen. The eighteenth-century chemists did not content themselves 
with giving a hypothetical explanation of water’s behaviour in terms of its elemental 
composition. Rather, they took known weights of water, decomposed them into hydrogen and 
oxygen, weighed the separate elements to establish that their combined weights were (roughly) 
the same as those of the decomposed water, then recombined them, recovering close to the 
original weights of water. Later, in the nineteenth century, they introduced quantitative 
compositional formulae, which represented the proportions between the constituent elements: 
H2O in the case of water.3 Finally, the compositional formulae came to be interpreted as 
embodying molecular facts (in some cases): for water, that its characteristic molecule contains 
two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen (however, such atomist interpretations were 
controversial for much of the nineteenth century). All this should be salutary for materialist 
philosophers of mind who would wish to use parallels between “water is H2O” and “pain is c-
fibres firing” as a guide in developing a materialist theory of the mind. Establishing that water is 
H2O was a detailed process, whose first step involved the analysis of water into its proposed 
constituents, and then a re-synthesis from them. It does not seem unreasonable to withhold one’s 
assent to “pain is c-fibres firing” until something analogous has been achieved. 
That point made, how should “water is H2O” be construed? To survey the alternatives we need to 
identify the relata (water and H2O) and the relation itself.4 First consider the relata: following 
Paul Needham, we can treat “water” and “H2O” as predicates, or more likely a range of 
predicates. We can discuss whether these predicates correspond to properties later. What does it 
mean to say that something is water? First note that some substance names—“ice” or “diamond” 
for instance—refer only to specific states of aggregation: the name determines whether the 
relevant stuff is solid, liquid or gas. Other substance names are used independently of
 
state of 
aggregation, which must be added explicitly if it is to be specified, as in “liquid nitrogen” or 
“solid carbon dioxide”. “Water” has a phase-neutral use, in which we may ask (for instance) how 
much of it there is in the solar system.5 A comprehensive answer will include the solid water in 
the polar icecaps of various planets,6 liquid water in their seas (perhaps only in the case of the 
Earth), water vapour in their atmospheres and also isolated water molecules strung out in 
interplanetary space. In the case of hydrogen one would have to include the large quantities 
present as plasma in the interior of the sun. Clearly, nothing of interest depends on whether one 
                                                           
3 Note that the proportions were not between the weights of the elements, but between equivalents, thus “water is 
H2O” represents the fact that it contains twice as many equivalents of hydrogen as of oxygen, although the oxygen-
hydrogen weight ratio in water is more like 8:1. 
4
 In the following discussion I am in indebted in many ways to Paul Needham ((2000), and many conversations), 
although we are in clear disagreement on some of the issues. 
5
 Note that various chemical processes produce and consume water. Hence the total amount of water in the solar 
system will vary, so the question must be asked with reference to some period of time. 
6
 In fact John Finney (2004) identifies sixteen distinct structures for ice, which form under different thermodynamic 
conditions. 
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allows the phase-neutral scientific usage, or insists on the supposed “ordinary language” usage (I 
use scare quotes because I am highly sceptical that there is an ordinary language usage that is 
consistent enough to be said to have an extension). From the chemists' point of view, since there 
is something important that all water's different states of aggregation share, it makes sense to 
have one name for all these forms. 
Now consider “being H2O”. People who know little of chemistry may take this simply to be a 
molecular condition (something like “being composed of H2O molecules”), but in general a 
chemical formula need not convey much information at the molecular level: it may, for instance, 
specify just the elemental composition of a substance, which may be shared by more than one 
substance. The formula “C2H6O”, for instance, applies both to ethanol (often written 
CH3CH2OH) and dimethyl ether (sometimes written CH3OCH3), which are distinct compounds 
with very different physical and chemical properties. So we must ask, is “H2O” intended to 
specify the molecular make-up of water, or merely its elemental composition? 
Finally we come to the relation itself. It is well known that “A is B” bears interpretation in terms 
of either identity or predication. In the present case two such interpretations suggest themselves: 
clearly “water” and “H2O” are not the same predicate, though they may correspond to the same 
property. A weaker interpretation involves a relation of coextension or containment between the 
two predicates or properties: all A is B. If a necessity operator is envisaged (and on
 
my view, one 
is required), then the source of the necessity is important. On the strongest microstructural 
essentialist view, which I would endorse, the relationship could be put in one of two ways: 
(identity) to be water is to be composed of H2O molecules; (coextension) necessarily, all samples 
of water are samples of stuff composed of H2O molecules, with the necessity in question being 
full metaphysical necessity. Putting this all together, “water is H2O” could mean either (i) “to be 
water is to be made up of two parts of hydrogen to one part (by equivalents) of oxygen”; (ii) “to 
be water is to be composed of H2O molecules”; (iii) “every sample of water is made up of two 
parts of hydrogen to one part (by equivalents) of oxygen”; and (iv) “every sample of water is 
composed of H2O molecules”. Different versions of (iii) and (iv) also result if modal operators 
are appended, and also if one attends to the source of such modality (see van Brakel (2000)). 
Even if one takes the strongest essentialist reading, according which to be water is to be H2O, 
then on the only scientifically plausible reading of what it is to be H2O, reductionism does not 
follow. Why? Hilary Putnam once said that the extension of “water” is “the set of all wholes 
consisting of H2O molecules” (Putnam (1975: 224)). If a “whole” is taken to be a mereological 
sum, or any other composition operation in which the components are assumed to survive, this is 
straightforwardly false according to chemistry. Being a whole that consists of H2O molecules 
may well be sufficient to be a quantity of water, but it is not necessary. Pure liquid water 
contains other things apart from H2O molecules: a small but significant proportion of H2O 
molecules (at room temperature, about 1 in 107) dissociate (or self-ionise) forming H3O+ and 
OH− ions: 
 
 2H2O ⇌ H3O+ + OH− 
 
Furthermore, H2O molecules are polar and form hydrogen-bonded chains which are similar in 
structure to ice. One might regard the ionic dissociation products and chains as impurities, but 
the presence of these charged species is central to understanding water’s electrical conductivity. 
Since chemists regard the electrical conductivity they measure as a property of pure water, it 
seems gratuitous for we philosophers to interpret it instead as a property of an aqueous solution 
of water’s ionic dissociation products. Looked at this way, liquid water can at best be considered 
to be composed of some diverse and constantly changing population of species at the molecular 
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scale, including H2O molecules, H3O+ and OH− ions, and various oligomolecular species. Can 
we defend the claim that water is H2O? Yes, by considering water in all its forms to be the 
substance brought into being by interactions among H2O molecules (see Hendry (2006b)).7 
One way to summarise all this is to regard being water as a distinct property that both molecular 
species and macroscopic bodies of stuff can have. H2O molecules have it merely in virtue of 
being H2O molecules. Larger bodies of stuff get it by being composed of (possibly diverse) 
populations of molecular species of kinds which are produced when H2O molecules interact. 
Given the assumption that every part of water is water, this means that molecular species (such 
as H3O+ and OH− ions) can be water in virtue of being part of a diverse population of molecular 
species which is produced when H2O molecules interact. Hence they acquire the property of 
being water by association. There is nothing strange in this. If we consider the protons in water 
to be part of the water, they acquire their wateriness by association too. 
In a less exciting sense, wateriness is therefore an emergent property because nothing below a 
particular size (that of an H2O molecule) can be water on its own account, and some smaller 
fragments acquire the property by association. But that doesn't tell us whether being water is a 
strongly emergent property, i.e., whether or not being water confers additional causal powers. 
This is where the standard argument I mentioned earlier comes in, except we can now see that it 
runs into difficulty. Consider all the different kinds of thing that, we have agreed, count as 
quantities of water, from mereological sums of water molecules, through steam, liquid water and 
(the various forms of) ice. Trivially, a mereological sum of water molecules is no more than the 
sum of its parts. Any powers it has are acquired from its constituent H2O molecules. But it has no 
bulk properties, so there is no distinction to be made between its molecular and its bulk 
properties. Steam, liquid water and (the various forms of) ice do have bulk properties, each 
bearing distinct sets of properties produced by the distinct kinds of interactions between their 
parts. Wherever there is significant interaction between the H2O molecules, there is scope for 
that interaction to bring new powers into being. This is particularly obvious if that interaction 
includes self-ionisation and the formation of oligomers: the excess charge of solvated protons 
can be transported across a body of liquid water without the transport of any matter to carry it, 
via what is called the Grotthuss mechanism. This, in fact is why water conducts electricity so 
well, unlike other, similar hydrides. The power to conduct electricity is not possessed by any sum 
of (neutral) H2O molecules. The mechanism by which that power is exercised requires some part 
of the molecular population to be charged. It therefore depends on a feature of a diverse 
population of molecular species. 
The reductionist will say at this point that the water can only acquire its causal powers from its 
parts, and interactions between them. So no novel causal powers have been introduced. The 
strong emergentist will ask why, when it is being decided whether they are novel, the powers 
acquired only when the molecules interact are already accounted for by the powers of
 
H2O 
molecules. If the rule is that any power possessed by any molecular population produced by any 
interaction between H2O molecules is included, and we know this rule to apply independently of 
any empirical information we might ever acquire about what water can do and how it does it, 
then it seems that we know a priori that there will be no novel causal powers, which violates the 
rules of our discussion. This does not of course mean that the strong emergentist wins the 
argument by default: only that in the absence of a specific scientific argument, the reductionist 
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 Note that I have ignored the token identity question, which I take to be an irrelevance from the point of view of 
science. 
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and the strong emergentist conclude this discussion honours even. Anti-reductionists need not 
fear theoretical identities, and should even learn to love them. 
 
4. Molecular Structure and Quantum Mechanics. 
Our other possible locus for emergence in chemistry is molecular structure. Are molecules 
anything more than systems of charged particles, interacting according to the laws of quantum 
mechanics? I seem to be in a minority of one in giving that question an affirmative answer, and 
certainly so when I defend the idea that molecular structure is strongly emergent. Yet I think the 
unanimity on the other side is baseless, as I have argued elsewhere (see Hendry (2006a), (2010a), 
(2010b)). Because this is familiar territory, I will give these issues a fairly brisk treatment here. 
Textbooks of physical chemistry often present the application of quantum mechanics to 
chemistry as a process that begins with the writing down of a Schrödinger equation for an 
isolated molecule, purely in terms of the electrons and nuclei present. The aim is to solve the 
equation and thereby explain the characteristic structures of molecules, which chemists have 
used to explain the chemical behaviour of substances since the 1860s. When it appeared on the 
scene in the mid-1920s, quantum mechanics was widely expected to provide a complete account 
of chemistry. Just a few years later, Paul Dirac famously wrote: 
 
“The underlying physical laws necessary for the mathematical theory of a large part of physics and the whole of 
chemistry are thus completely known, and the difficulty is only that the exact application of these laws leads to 
equations much too complicated to be soluble. It therefore becomes desirable that approximate methods of applying 
quantum mechanics should be developed, which can lead to an explanation of the main features of complex atomic 
systems without too much computation”. (Dirac (1929: 714)) 
 
Here, non-relativistic quantum mechanics is assumed to be a sort of “theory of everything” for 
the motions of electrons and nuclei, and therefore for any molecule. Physicists and philosophers 
who use that phrase usually mean a theory that could—in principle—explain everything that 
happens in a system to which it is applied, to the extent that it can be explained. Think of 
Newton’s laws applied to the planetary motions: natural philosophers since Newton’s time have 
imagined a God’s-eye-view application of his laws which could be used to predict all future 
planetary positions, if only we had accurate enough access to their current positions and 
momenta, plus large enough computers to cope with very detailed and accurate mathematical 
models of the solar system. A more formal way to put this is to say that in a multi-dimensional 
configuration space representing the dynamical state of the solar system, the laws governing 
planetary motions uniquely specify its future evolution, given only its current state. The question 
of whether molecular structure is strongly emergent is, I think, best understood as the question of 
whether we have good reasons to think that, from a God’s-eye-view, non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics is a “theory of everything” in this sense, or whether some looser relationship between 
the dynamics and the evolution of the system is better supported. 
The problem raised by Dirac is that for any chemical system bigger than a hydrogen atom, the 
Schrödinger equation, the central equation of this theory of everything, is insoluble analytically. 
This means that approximations must be introduced: known falsehoods that will affect the 
calculations in well-understood ways. For molecules, this means the Born-Oppenheimer or 
‘small oscillation’ approximation. It is worthwhile separating this into two separate moves. First, 
nuclear and electronic motions are considered as separate (even though electrons and nuclei are 
known to interact), yielding an overall wavefunction that is a product of nuclear and electronic 
wavefunctions. In the second step the nuclei are then assumed to be at rest, on account of their 
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much higher masses, and therefore slower motion. The problem of calculating the wavefunction 
for the electrons can now be addressed on its own, and the molecule’s energy calculated from 
that. In the last twenty years or so this problem has increasingly been addressed through density 
functional theory (DFT), in which the aim is to calculate the electron density, rather than the 
molecular orbitals of yore. The electronic energy can be calculated for a few nuclear 
configurations near the (empirically given) equilibrium configuration, and the fact that it is the 
equilibrium configuration is thus explained, after a fashion: it is the local minimum in a 
particular region of the potential-energy surface. The problem is that it is explained in a way that 
seems to undermine the status of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a theory of everything 
for molecules, and therefore for chemistry. 
Brian Sutcliffe and Guy Woolley (2012) argue that the Born-Oppenheimer approximation should 
not be called an approximation, because it fundamentally alters important mathematical 
properties of the equations and their solutions. Sutcliffe and Woolley raise two difficulties, 
concerning isomers and symmetry properties. Turning to isomers first, the Schrödinger equation 
for a molecule is fully determined once the nuclei and electrons present are enumerated. This 
means that isomers, such as ethanol (CH3CH2OH) and dimethyl ether (CH3OCH3), mentioned 
earlier, will share the same Schrödinger equation. But the Born-Oppenheimer equations for 
ethanol and dimethyl ether are quite different. In applying the Born-Oppenheimer approximation 
we have moved straight from an equation that applies to both of these molecules to a different 
equation that applies to just one of them and not the other. How, from a mathematical point of 
view, did we do that? By putting in by hand the parameters that specify an important difference 
between the two cases: the nuclear positions. We have explained the geometrical configuration 
of an ethanol molecule as a local minimum on a particular potential-energy surface. We have 
explained the geometrical configuration of a dimethyl ether molecule as a local minimum on its 
particular potential-energy surface. But can we say we have a “theory of everything” that 
encompasses all of this? We have an equation that, in a sense, allows both possibilities. But that 
is a very weak way of being a theory of everything. We cannot say that it determines the 
different possibilities to arise when they do arise. Do we have good reasons to say that quantum 
mechanics is any more than this, unless supplemented with structural insights from chemistry? 
The second problem concerns symmetry. For good physical reasons, the only force appearing in 
molecular Schrödinger equations is the electrostatic or Coulomb force: other forces are 
negligible at the relevant scales. But the Coulomb force has spherical symmetry. How, from this 
slim basis, do we get the great variety of different symmetry properties (chiral (asymmetrical), 
cylindrical, hexagonal and many more) exhibited by real molecules? In practice the lower 
symmetries are introduced as part of the Born-Oppenheimer approximation. Surely 
‘approximation’ is a misnomer for a procedure that changes the symmetry properties of the 
problem, introducing the specific symmetry properties we need to understand the behaviour of 
each kind of molecule on a case-by-case basis. 
I now turn to the strong emergentist interpretation of this situation, which I offer not because I 
am committed to it, but to establish the plausibility of an alternative to ontological reductionism, 
and its strong interpretation of what it is to be a “theory of everything.” The strong emergentist 
sees the role of quantum mechanics as much closer to that of thermodynamics: its universal laws 
deepen our understanding of the behaviour of the systems to which we apply it, but it cannot 
explain everything. Thermodynamics must always be applied in tandem with other information 
about the system. Likewise, the Schrödinger equation provides an important framework for 
studying molecules, because it encompasses all the possibilities, but for that very reason it is 
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implausible to see it as fully specifying the dynamical behaviour of every kind of molecule, 
given only the charges and masses of the constituent particles. It is too abstract on its own, and 
far removed from the particular structures we study in chemistry. It allows too many other, un-
chemical possibilities, and we have no general account of the different classes of solutions it 
does allow, or of the relationships between them. So instead we simply assume that the known 
structures exist, and explore the energetic landscape around them to provide an understanding of 
their dynamical behaviour. 
 
5. Objections and Replies. 
In this section I respond to some common objections to the idea that chemical substances and 
molecular structure could be strongly emergent. 
 
Objection 1: The chemical bond is “just a model” 
One response to the foregoing arguments, available to the philosopher or scientist who is 
temperamentally disposed to physicalism, is to deny the reality of anything which is irreducible 
to physics, arguing that anything which cannot be reduced to the physical is of dubious 
physicalistic respectability. To the emergentist this is a cheap move, since it begs the question by 
declaring unreal anything that doesn’t fit within the physicalist’s philosophy. And a cheap move 
it is, unless it is backed up with independent grounds for denying the reality of the items in 
question. In the case of abstract objects such as numbers, independent grounds for questioning 
them might be that they are not located in time and space, raising the question of how we can 
know anything of them. A more detailed and interesting version of this kind of response would 
draw upon independent scientific considerations in the case against the dubious items. Alexander 
Rosenberg (1994) has argued that biology studies properties and processes which have been 
honed by natural selection. They are highly complex and multiply realised, so it is beyond 
human cognition to grasp the underlying (chemical and physical) reasons why these processes 
work in just the ways they do. Instead, biology must fashion functional explanations which 
Rosenberg proposes to interpret instrumentally, since they do not latch on to the fundamental 
(physical) forces that drive things. Even in this case the independent grounds for doubting the 
reality of functionally-characterised properties and processes are only semi-scientific. There have 
long been worries within biology that function has a whiff of teleology, but Rosenberg’s 
argument also depends on the presumption that the underlying reasons why biological processes 
work the way they do can only be found in the chemical and physical realisers.8 That is a 
different objection (see below, Objection 3). 
In the case of chemistry, the scientific pedigree of instrumentalism about structure is quite as 
long as that of structural explanation itself. Around the mid-nineteenth century, chemists were 
divided on whether or not chemical formulae should be used; they were divided on whether or 
not chemical formulae should be given an atomistic interpretation, and what this involved; and 
they were divided on whether, under an atomistic interpretation, chemical formulae should be 
interpreted literally (see Rocke (1984)). This can be read partly as reasonable caution. Structural 
explanation was purely hypothetical in the 1860s and 1870s. Chemists constructed a range of 
possible structures which both respected the elemental composition of the substance, and were 
‘“legal” by valence rules,’9 to borrow a phrase from Alan Rocke (2010: 132). They then selected 
from among these possibilities on the basis of chemical evidence. It was only in the twentieth 
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 For this reason John Dupré (1995: 283) identifies Rosenberg as a ‘frustrated reductionist’. 
9 The ‘valence rules’ determined, for each type of atom, how many other atoms it could be linked to by bonds. 
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century that X-ray crystallography and various kinds of spectroscopy allowed structural theory 
and experiment to become more closely integrated, with the measurement of (for instance) bond 
lengths and (vibrational) force constants. A second problem was that molecular structures 
consisted of atoms connected by bonds, but the bond was no more than an explanatory role in a 
theory. There was no account of what bonds were, or how they attached one atom to another. G. 
N. Lewis identified paired electrons as the realisers of this role, but given that Lewis’ atom was 
static while physics seemed to demand constant motion, it was far from clear how the physicists’ 
and the chemists’ models could both be true (see Arabatzis (2006: chapter 7)), with Lewis even 
querying whether chemistry would require a revision of Coulomb’s law at short distances (Lewis 
(1917)). By the mid-1920s quantum mechanics had come into being, a theory which seemed to 
pose severe difficulties for Lewis’ conception of structure, because electrons ought to be 
delocalised: smeared out across the whole molecule, rather than held static between two atoms. 
As we have already seen, the advent of quantum mechanics in the 1920s brought in its train 
fundamental equations describing molecules which could not be solved exactly. The chemists 
and physicists who faced this situation in the early days of quantum mechanics developed semi-
empirical models. They interpreted the situation in quite different ways (see Hendry (2003)). 
Linus Pauling saw quantum chemistry as a synthesis of quantum mechanics and autonomous 
structural insights provided by chemistry. John Clarke Slater, who was, with Pauling, one of the 
founders of the valence-bond method for constructing semi-empirical models of bonding, saw 
that method instead as something that stood proxy for the exact equations which Dirac had 
recognised to be “much too complicated to be soluble”. On this view, quantum chemistry should 
be much less autonomous, with every explanatory step justified as one that could also be made in 
the exact theory. The problem is that these strictures have only rarely ever been met. The 
explanatory and predictive successes of quantum mechanics in chemistry, including the novel 
predictions provided by the Woodward-Hoffmann rules (see Brush (1999)) were achieved 
through simplified models which neglected the quantum-mechanical character of parts of the 
molecules whose behaviour they predicted, assuming them instead to be classical. Quantum 
chemistry seems more like Pauling’s synthesis than Slater’s reduction. 
All this motivates the following argument, which I have heard in different forms from chemists, 
physicists and philosophers. The chemical bond is a theoretical figment. It was useful in the 
1860s, and remains useful now, for predictive and heuristic purposes. But bonds are not real. 
Quantum mechanics, which provides the best description of the world at the atomic level, has 
shown the structural theories of the 1860s to be at best naive portrayals of molecular reality. 
I do not find this argument convincing, and more generally I am at a loss to understand why 
philosophers and scientists alike are so ready to approach the results of the special sciences in a 
spirit of ontological non-seriousness, yet the craziest ideas from physics are taken much more 
seriously.10 The argument for instrumentalism about molecular structure can be resisted in a 
number of different ways. Firstly, structural theory has been around for a very long time—some 
sixty years longer than non-relativistic quantum mechanics—and its development has been 
cumulative: the theory itself, and the structures assigned to substances within it, have been 
retained or extended, our understanding of them deepened by the interaction with physics. I cite 
two scientific authorities in support of this claim. In a systematic presentation of his views on 
structure and bonding, Lewis said that 
 
                                                           
10 Consider the existence of multiverses and realist interpretations of N-particle wavefunctions propagating in 3N-
dimensional space. 
10 
 
“No generalization of science, even if we include those capable of exact mathematical statement, has ever achieved 
a greater success in assembling in simple form a multitude of heterogeneous observations than this group of ideas 
which we call structural theory.” (Lewis (1923: 20-21)) 
 
In his presidential address to the Annual General Meeting of the Chemical Society (later to 
become the Royal Society of Chemistry) in April 1936, Nevil Sidgwick rejected the idea that 
new scientific theories must always overthrow the conceptions of their predecessors (Sidgwick 
(1936)). A detailed examination of the development of chemistry, he argued, revealed that 
although “the progress of knowledge does indeed correct certain details in our ideas”, the 
structural theory of Kekulé, laid down in the 1860s, had “undergone no serious modifications” 
(Sidgwick (1936: 533)). As we have seen, the chemists of the 1860s had assigned molecular 
structures to substances so as to account for isomerism, and Sidgwick confidently asserted that 
“[a]mong the hundreds of thousands of known substances, there are never more isomeric forms 
than the theory permits” (Sidgwick (1936: 533)). Subsequent developments had clearly enriched 
the theory, in two ways. On the one hand, Kekulé’s theory “assumes that the molecule is held 
together by links between one atom and the next,” but in that theory “[n]o assumption 
whatsoever is made as to the mechanism of the linkage” (Sidgwick (1936: 533)). A proposal as 
to how molecular structure is realised came only later, in Lewis’ theory of the electron-pair bond. 
On the other hand, later developments enriched structures with detail: 
 
“To Kekulé the links had no properties beyond that of linking; but we now know their lengths, their heats of 
formation, their resistance to deformation, and the electrostatic disturbance which they involve.” (Sidgwick (1936: 
533-534)) 
 
He concluded: 
 
“I hope I have said enough to show that the modern development of the structural theory, far from destroying the 
older doctrine, has given it a longer and a fuller life.” (Sidgwick (1936: 538)) 
 
A second argument against an instrumentalist interpretation of structural theory is that its 
development has been extremely fruitful from an empirical point of view: structural theory has 
underwritten the design and synthesis of many thousands of new substances; the theories of 
reaction mechanisms developed from the 1920s onwards depended on Lewis’ insight that the 
chemical bond is realised by pairs of electrons. If longevity, theoretical continuity and 
fruitfulness are hallmarks of the real, then structure has a claim on our commitment, and perhaps 
a stronger one than quantum mechanics, on the basis of which it is called into question. Thirdly, 
the conflicts with quantum mechanics are often overstated. To be sure, Lewis’s static electron 
pairs seem naive, but within theoretical chemistry the attempt to recover different aspects of 
‘classical’ structure and Lewis’ account of bonding remain important (see for instance Bader 
(1990)), for the explanatory successes of these theories must be accommodated somehow within 
the theory which replaces them. I think these considerations should give us pause before we 
sweep away these intellectual achievements of chemistry with the wave of an instrumentalist 
hand. 
 
Objection 2: Chemistry doesn’t study properties 
Famously, Fodor presented multiple realisation as a sign of the autonomy of the special sciences 
(Fodor (1974)). Special sciences find “higher-level’ (in this case, functional) properties, such as 
being in pain, indispensible in predicting and explaining how things go, yet such properties 
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cannot be identical with any group of physical properties if they are realised by different groups 
in different organisms. It is now quite common to respond to this argument by arguing that the 
autonomy of the special sciences may only be in the eye of the (scientific) beholder, masking a 
deeper ontological unity in the world. Perhaps the special sciences do not study properties at all, 
but instead functionally-defined predicates, and the relationships between them. Here is one 
argument to that effect, adapted from John Heil (2003), (2012): to call something a ‘property’ is 
to treat it with full ontological seriousness. But it cannot be assumed that special-science 
predicates should be approached in this way merely because they are useful, or even 
indispensible in predicting and explaining how things go. Such an abundant view of properties 
could be assumed if they were just the intensions of the worldly shadows of meaningful 
predicates, but there are many reasons to set the bar higher than that. Heil (2012) proposes a less 
serious stance toward special-science categories, allowing that statements involving special-
science predicates have truthmakers among the real. In this way the physicalist can get 
vanishingly close to taking the special sciences (ontologically) seriously without actually doing 
so, even endorsing semantic realism. 
The emergentist can reply as follows. One can think that special sciences study properties 
without committing the fallacy of adopting the abundant theory of properties (if fallacy it is). As 
we have seen, causal efficacy is often identified as a mark of reality. Being water confers on a 
body of matter the power to quench thirst or dissolve salt. A water molecule’s structure confers 
on it powers to interact in distinct ways with other species at the molecular scale. As we have 
seen, there is an argument about whether these powers are really inherited from physical 
properties, but when the Eleatic principle or Alexander’s dictum is applied, this is an argument 
about whether or not water is a distinct reality over and above its physical basis, or merely a 
dependent reality. In either case it is a part of reality. 
Consider optical activity: in the early nineteenth century, chemists and physicists noticed that 
some crystals possess the power to rotate plane-polarised light by a characteristic angle. 
Strikingly, these optically active crystals came in two forms, one which rotates light in one 
direction, the other rotating it in the opposite direction, by the same angle. The dissymmetrical 
behaviour was presumed to arise from some internal dissymmetry, but in the particles 
themselves, or in the way they combine to make up the crystal? In 1849, Louis Pasteur separated, 
by hand, crystals of the L- and D- forms of the salt of an optically-active acid, sodium 
ammonium tartrate, which he had obtained from a racemic solution (an equal mixture of the 
two). Pasteur then dissolved the L- and D- crystals, and showed that they retained the rotatory 
power in solution, a power which must therefore reside in the individual particles of the tartrate. 
In the 1870s, Jacobus van 't Hoff and Joseph Achille Le Bel independently proposed that the 
optical activity arises when four different functional groups are attached to a single (chiral) 
carbon atom, giving rise to two possible structures which are non-superimposable mirror images 
of each other: incongruent counterparts, like right and left hands. A full physical explanation of 
how the structural asymmetry gives rise to the power had to wait until the 1930s (for details see 
Needham (2004)). I have told this scientific story as if complex objects—chiral molecules, or 
molecular populations—can (irreducibly) possess powers, such as to rotate plane-polarised light 
or conduct electricity. Our other candidate locus of emergence in chemistry—the emergence of a 
macroscopic body of stuff from its molecular constituents—we illustrated with water, and its 
power to conduct electricity. 
Heil points out that the classes of things that fall under some special-science predicates do not 
exactly resemble each other. Thus, for instance 
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“biologists ‘abstract away’ from physical differences that would be blindingly salient from the point of view of 
physics, or chemistry, or, for that matter, molecular biology.” (Heil (2012: 195)) 
 
Yet it is not clear that all special-science predicates can be dismissed in this way. ‘L-tartaric 
acid’ is not a functional category, and the fact that it can be individuated by the structure of its 
molecules does not establish its reducibility, as we saw in the case of water. Nor is it clear why 
only special-science predicates can be dismissed in this way. The point about abstraction seems 
unfair on the special sciences because all sciences, including fundamental physics, engage in 
abstraction, that is, partial consideration of the similarities among a class of objects, and ignoring 
the differences. Now it might be said that fundamental physics abstracts away only from 
relational differences in the complex causal situations in which its objects participate. Perhaps 
so, but the emergentist will ask again why such relational differences cannot be irreducibly 
causally relevant. 
For Heil, causal efficacy is not sufficient for being a property: properties can only be instantiated 
by substances, and substances must be simple. He does not rule out strong emergence, but 
properties require substances to instantiate them. In short, strongly emergent properties require 
emergent substances.11 This is not the place for a detailed examination of Heil’s interesting and 
heterodox ontological views, but I do find the idea that complex entities should be excluded a 
priori from ontological seriousness merely in virtue of their complexity a deeply unscientific 
one. The ways that complex chemical objects and situations are, in virtue of which they have 
causal powers, are as good a candidate as anything in science for being properties. Scientific 
metaphysics, it seems to me, has no business denying this. Metaphysics should not stray too far 
from science in what it will countenance, in the direction either of permissiveness or restriction.12 
 
Objection 3: The causal closure of physics 
A third and final objection I will consider is that chemical substances or structures cannot be 
strongly emergent because their being so would entail the possibility of downward causation. But 
downward causation is not possible, because the physical is causally closed. One must admit that 
the existence of strong emergence in chemistry is incompatible with the causal closure of the 
physical. Closure is widely assumed by philosophers, and is an essential part of the problem of 
causal exclusion (a philosophical pseudoproblem if ever there was one). Closure is hardly ever 
argued for however, honourable exceptions being the arguments offered by Brian McLaughlin 
(1992) and David Papineau (2002: 232-256), which I have responded to elsewhere (Hendry 
(2006a), (2010a), (2010b)). This is not the place for a general review of evidence for closure, but 
I will conclude with the following argument. 
Closure is a thesis that concerns the relationship of physics to everything else, so to find 
evidence for it we must look beyond the internal structure of physical theories, and see how they 
are applied to the special sciences. Of all the special sciences, chemistry has the closest 
relationship to physics, which as we have seen is embodied in two great scientific achievements. 
Firstly there is the twentieth-century discovery that chemical substances can be individuated, and 
their behaviour understood, in terms of their structures  at the atomic scale. Secondly there is the 
                                                           
11
 If this sounds like a contradiction, because a strongly emergent substance would need to be both dependent and 
independent, Heil can point to a distinction between (causal) maintenance and ontological dependence. 
12
 Peter van Inwagen (2014: 1-14) has recently described the ‘ontology room’, where existence can be discussed. My 
hope is that the ontology room can overlap with the science room, where actual existence is discussed, not merely 
what is possible or necessary. 
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fact that non-relativistic quantum mechanics provides a “theory of everything” for molecules, an 
all-encompassing framework within which to understand their dynamical behaviour. Yet neither 
of these facts entails closure. In short, chemistry is where one might expect to find the imperial 
ambitions of physics fully played out, if they are played out anywhere. It is where we might 
expect to see some evidence for closure. Yet as I have argued above, strong emergence is a 
plausible interpretation of the evidence offered by the explanatory relationships between physics 
and chemistry, which must surely weaken the case for closure. 
 
Acknowledgements: I am most grateful to Alex Carruth, John Heil, Tom Lancaster, Tom 
McLeish, Michele Paolini Paoletti and members of the Durham Emergence Project reading 
group for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to the John 
Templeton Foundation for generously supporting the Durham Emergence Project itself. 
 
References. 
Arabatzis, T. (2006). Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
Bader, R. F. W. (1990). Atoms in Molecules: A Quantum Theory. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Broad, C. D. (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Kegan Paul, Trench and 
Trubner 
Brush, S. G. (1999). “Dynamics of theory change in chemistry: Part 2. Benzene and molecular 
orbitals, 1945-1980”. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 30: 263-302 
Colyvan, M. (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Dirac, P. A. M. (1929). “The quantum mechanics of many-electron systems”. Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London, A123: 714-733 
Dupré, J. (1995). Review of Rosenberg (1994). Canadian Philosophical Reviews, 15: 283-285 
Finney, J. L. (2004). “Water? What’s so special about it?”. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B, 359: 1145-1165 
Fodor, J. A. (1974). “Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)”. 
Synthese, 28: 97-115 
Heil, J. (2003). From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
______ (2012). The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hendry, R. F. (2003). “Autonomy, explanation and theoretical values: physicists and chemists on 
molecular quantum mechanics”. In: Earley, J. (ed.), Chemical Explanation: Characteristics, 
Development, Autonomy: Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 988: 44-58 
______ (2006a). “Is there downward causation in chemistry?”. In: Baird, D., McIntyre, L., 
Scerri, E., (eds.) Philosophy of Chemistry: Synthesis of a New Discipline. Dordrecht: Springer: 
173-189 
______ (2006b). “Elements, compounds and other chemical kinds”. Philosophy of Science, 73: 
864-875 
______ (2008). “Microstructuralism: problems and prospects”. In: Ruthenberg, K., van Brakel, J. 
(eds.), Stuff: The Nature of Chemical Substances. Würzburg: Königshausen und von Neumann: 
107-120 
______ (2010a). “Ontological reduction and molecular structure”. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41: 183-191 
14 
 
______ (2010b). “Chemistry: emergence vs. reduction”. In: Macdonald, C., Macdonald, G. 
(eds.), Emergence in Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010: 205-221 
______ (2016). “Natural kinds in chemistry”. In: Fisher, G., Scerri, E. (eds.), Essays in the 
Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 253-275 
Kim, J. (1998). Mind in a Physical World. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press 
______ (2005). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press 
Lewis, G. N. (1917) “The static atom”. Science, 46: 297-302 
______ (1923). Valence and the Structure of Atoms and Molecules. Washington D.C.: Chemical 
Catalogue Company Page references are to the 1966 reprint (New York: Dover) 
Malt, B. (1994). “Water is not H2O”. Cognitive Psychology, 27: 41-70 
McLaughlin, B. (1992). “The rise and fall of British Emergentism”. In: Beckermann, A., Flohr, 
H., Kim, J. (eds.), Emergence or reduction? Essays on the Prospects for Nonreductive 
Physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter: 49-93 
Needham, Paul (2000). “What is Water?”. Analysis, 60: 13-21 
______ (2002). “The Discovery that Water is H2O”. International Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, 16: 205-226 
______ (2004). “When did atoms begin to do any explanatory work in chemistry?”. 
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 18: 199-219 
______ (2011). “Microessentialism: What is the argument?” Noûs, 45: 1-21 
Papineau, D. (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Putnam, H. (1975). “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. In his Mind Language and Reality. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press: 215-271 
Rocke, A. J. (1984). Chemical Atomism in the Nineteenth Century: From Dalton to Cannizzaro. 
Columbus (OH): Ohio State University Press 
______ (2010). Image and Reality: Kekulé, Kopp, and the Scientific Imagination. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press 
Rosenberg, A. (1994). Instrumental Biology, or The Disunity of Science. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 
Sidgwick, N.V. (1936). “Structural chemistry”. Journal of the Chemical Society, 149: 533-538 
Sutcliffe, B., Woolley, R. G. (2012) “Atoms and molecules in classical chemistry and quantum 
mechanics”. In: Hendry, R. F., Needham, P., Woody, A. I. (eds.), Philosophy of Chemistry. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier: 387-426 
van Brakel, J. (2000). Philosophy of Chemistry. Leuven: Leuven University Press 
van Inwagen, P. (2014). Existence: Essays in Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Weisberg, M. (2006). “Water is not H2O”. In: Baird, D., McIntyre, L., Scerri, E., (eds.) 
Philosophy of Chemistry: Synthesis of a New Discipline. Dordrecht: Springer: 337-345 
 
  
 
